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THE DIVINE CONTROLLER ARGUMENT
FOR INCOMPATIBILISM
Katherin A. Rogers

Incompatibilists hold that, in order for you to be responsible, your choices
must come from yourself; thus, determinism is incompatible with responsibility. One way of defending this claim is the Controller Argument: You
are not responsible if your choices are caused by a controller, and natural
determinism is relevantly similar to such control, therefore . . . Q.E.D. Compatibilists dispute both of these premises, insisting upon a relevant dissimilarity, or allowing, in a tollens move, that since we can be determined and
responsible, we can be controlled and responsible. Positing a divine controller strengthens the argument against these two responses.

I. Introduction
Many incompatibilists hold that in order for you to be morally responsible
such that you might truly deserve praise and blame, reward and punishment, your choices must be free in that they are “up to you” in a robust
way. You must be able to act “from yourself” (a se) and so you have what
can be termed aseity.1 They judge that, if determinism is true, then your
choices are not “up to you” in the right way, and so determinism and
moral responsibility are incompatible. One recent way of attempting to
show this is through the “controller” argument.2 In the present paper I
argue that hypothesizing a divine controller strengthens the argument in
a number of ways, allowing the defender to respond successfully to the
two major criticisms advanced against the argument.
The controller argument goes like this: Hypothesize a controller—a
mad neuroscientist or a megalomaniac behavioral engineer—who causes
you to choose to do something (X) in such a way that your choice is necessitated. (In this context “cause” should be understood in a broad, and
1
This is the position defended by Anselm of Canterbury, arguably the first to develop
a systematic analysis of libertarian freedom. See Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 59–60.
2
Recent examples include Robert Kane, who proposes the argument as part of his defense of libertarianism in The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), 64–71, and Derk Pereboom, who uses it to bolster a medium-hard determinism in
“Determinism al Dente,” Nous 29 (1995), 21–45. These arguments have also been called
“manipulator” arguments, but I will argue that “manipulation” is not the right term to
describe divine control.
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stronger than counterfactual, sense. To cause something is to exert some
force or power to produce an effect. The controller brings it about.) Your
choice to X comes about in such a way that you could not possibly fail to
choose to X. And suppose that the controller controls without coercion,
and you do not even know of his activity. To adopt Robert Kane’s terminology, he is a “covert, nonconstraining controller” (CNC).3 You might “feel”
free, but nonetheless, the argument goes, it is intuitively obvious that you
cannot be held responsible for the choice to X. Why not? Because someone else made you make the choice. But, continues the incompatibilist,
analysis of the controller hypothesis shows that what precludes your
having moral responsibility is not so much that there is someone else
involved in your choice, but that their involvement causally necessitates
your choice. If your choice is causally necessitated by something other
than yourself, then you cannot be responsible for it.4 But if determinism
is true, everything is causally necessitated. Your choices are the inevitable product of something not yourself. So, in a deterministic universe, no
human choices are free in a sense which can ground moral responsibility.5
In response, the compatibilist who agrees with the initial intuition concerning the controlled agent’s lack of responsibility may reject the claim
that the causally necessitating factors at work in a deterministic universe
are the same or relevantly similar to those in the controller scenario, and
so he can argue that the conclusion need not follow. Alternatively, if the
compatibilist grants that the controller as cause and the deterministic universe as cause are the same or relevantly similar he can conclude that the
original intuition was misleading. Just as we can be free and responsible in
a determinist universe, we can be free and responsible when our choices
are caused by a controller. If this leaves us with an intuitive draw, it can be
argued that the incompatibilist loses, since it was he who proposed the
controller argument to discredit compatibilism.
Here I run the argument replacing a limited controller with God. This
move is mentioned in the current literature, but it has not been developed.6 Positing a divine controller improves the argument in a number
of ways, one of which deserves mention at the outset. The dispute here
Kane, Significance of Free Will, 65.
The qualifier “by something other than yourself” is required to take account of situations in which you have freely and responsibly constructed a situation such that your
choice is causally necessitated by that situation. In that case we might still hold you responsible.
5
Nowadays many philosophers allow that determinism is likely to be false, in that there
is good reason to believe that some things act indeterministically on the subatomic level.
The determinism that is of interest to us is on the level of middle-sized objects, especially
human agents, and I shall use the term “determinism” to apply to that level without meaning by it that absolutely all events are determined.
6
For example, Derk Pereboom quotes a devoted Calvinist in drawing out and making
vivid the entailments of insisting that we may be free and blameworthy though controlled
(“A Hard-line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 [2008], 160–170, see especially 165–167). But he does not make the
divine controller case the focus of his argument.
3
4
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is a battle of intuitions, and it may be relevant that the limited controller,
the mad neuroscientist or the megalomaniac behavioral engineer are the
inventions of philosophers to serve a fleeting purpose, while God has a
history and a following such that He must be taken seriously. The limited controllers are “thin,” bizarre, and evanescent, which makes them
suspect as “intuition pumps.” By “thin” I mean that all there is to them is
their role in the controller argument. They are bizarre figures, so it can be
argued that their weirdness is doing much of the heavy lifting in eliciting
the looked-for intuition. And they are evanescent. We do not really have to
worry about them since they exist only as fanciful hypotheses, safely confined to the pages of philosophical literature. As we do our philosophy,
we may commit to consequences involving these characters because we
believe that it is safe to do so. The consequences, like the characters, will
not “slop over” into “real life.” However, if we—or even just most of our
forebears and many of our neighbors—believed the controller to exist in
reality, then we might be more cautious about the conclusions we accept
regarding the controller scenario.
God, on the other hand, is not “thin.” The concept of God is systematic
and complex, so intuitions in His regard will not be based solely on a
narrow role in the controller argument. And, while God may be bizarre
in the sense that He is a very unusual sort of person, He is nonetheless
a common and well-known figure in Western thought. And the idea of
God has an importance that the ideas of the mad neuroscientist and of the
megalomaniac behavioral engineer do not. Our intuitions regarding the
God hypothesis are correspondingly likely to be more serious.
II. The Divine Controller Argument
Let us now sketch and then develop the divine controller argument.
1. If God causally necessitates your choice, then you are not morally
responsible for it.
2. Causal necessitation of your choice due to natural causes in a deterministic universe is relevantly similar to divine causal necessitation.7
Therefore
3. If natural causes in a deterministic universe causally necessitate
your choice, you are not morally responsible for it.
To defend the first premise, take an example: Say that murder is wrong
and that God has commanded you not to commit murder on pain of punishment. (Let us leave Hell out of the hypothesis, since the specter of an
infinite punishment for a finite crime might affect our intuitions.) Suppose that the punishment involved is a long period of suffering, equivalent to a life sentence without parole—the sort of punishment which is
7
Which is not to say that divine causation is like natural causation. All I need for the
argument is that both can causally necessitate an effect.
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standard in our society today. And now suppose that God directly causes
in you a choice to commit murder, which necessitates your subsequently
committing murder. Do you deserve that God should punish you? Surely
not! But why not? Because He made you choose to murder! Could our intuition be driven by repugnance at God himself punishing you for what
He made you do? God is, by hypothesis, perfectly just. If you deserve to
be punished, He ought to punish you. But allow that the punishment will
not be done by God, but by human agents. Still, God made you choose,
and so it seems that you do not deserve to be punished.
Note that the hypothesis does not entail that God Himself has committed a murder. He has merely caused you to choose and, subsequently,
to murder. Nor, by hypothesis, has God done anything wrong. Perhaps
your committing the murder is a necessary part of the larger divine plan
aimed at some great good which would otherwise be unobtainable. (Kant
might disapprove of this suggestion, but Augustine and Aquinas both
make similar claims.) Note also that I associate moral responsibility with
a strong concept of desert; in order to be morally responsible you must be
deserving of praise and blame and hence, in the right situations, of reward
and punishment.8 So in asking whether or not you deserve to be punished,
we are not asking the broader question of whether or not you ought to
be punished. Many philosophers uncouple punishment—the inflicting of
pain and suffering on someone in response to their bad behavior—from
desert, and do not find the concept of desert compelling.9 If someone does
not share the intuition that justice entails that the unrepentant evil-doer
deserves to suffer and the good deserve to be happy, it is difficult to say
much more to motivate agreement. And perhaps it is this fundamental
disagreement over desert that in large part drives the debate between
compatibilists and incompatibilists. All I need here is the intuition that,
in justice, you do not deserve to be punished for a deed God made you
do. There may be good reasons to inflict pain and suffering on you, but it
will not be because you deserve it. If the concept of desert does not find
a place in your moral landscape such that you have no strong intuitions
about what agents may or may not deserve, then you will find the divine
controller argument unmotivated.
And so back to the murder. Perhaps it is good and right that God causes
you to choose to murder and that we subsequently inflict pain on you. But
you cannot, in justice, be held responsible for what God made you do. Of
course, He did not make you do it against your will, but He made you do it
8
Derk Pereboom agrees that this is the understanding of moral responsibility that
underlies and drives the free will debate. See Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas, Four
Views on Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 86–87, 197–198. He refers to the
concept in question as basic desert, and does not attempt to justify what he takes to be a
wide-spread belief in basic desert, which is not surprising since, ultimately, he defends
hard determinism.
9
Daniel Dennett allows that determinism entails that we do not have “in-the-eyes-ofGod” guilt, but that we have enough freedom to be responsible, since punishment will
affect how we behave; see Elbow Room (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 156–165.
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nonetheless. But why does God’s making you choose conflict with your
responsibility? The reason is that the decisive causal impetus necessitating your choice does not come from you, but from God. It is not under
your control and precedes your choice logically and perhaps temporally.10
We can develop the divine controller argument a little more:
1. If God causally necessitates your choice, you are not morally responsible for it because the causal impetus necessitating your choice
is not under your control and precedes your choice logically and
perhaps temporally.
2. Causal necessitation of your choice due to natural causes in a deterministic universe is relevantly similar to divine causal necessitation.
Therefore
3. If natural causes in a deterministic universe causally necessitate
your choice, you are not morally responsible for it.
Compatibilism is false. Q.E.D.
III. Divine Control versus Natural Determinism
The compatibilist will respond that this is far too fast. For one thing, there
may be a relevant difference between the divine controller and natural
determinism such that Premise 2 is false and so the conclusion that there
is no responsibility in a determinist universe can be blocked.11 This is one
of the critiques Alfred Mele levels against Derk Pereboom’s controller argument, the four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom presents four
cases where agents’ choices are determined. He begins with a limited controller case where the controllers directly manipulate an agent’s mental
processes to produce a given choice. He holds that it is intuitively obvious
that the controlled agent is not responsible in this case. Then he moves
progressively through three more cases. The second involves indirect
control through programming. In the third, control is exercised through
rigorous training. The fourth results in the same consequences for necessitated choice on the part of the agent as in the third, but the causes are
natural, not produced by a controller. Pereboom argues that, just as it is
intuitively obvious in the first case, the three succeeding cases are sufficiently similar that they should elicit the intuition that the agent is not
responsible, and this includes case four, where natural causes produce the
agent’s choice in the determinist universe.

10
Classical theists may want to make the Anselmian move, which holds that the motive
power for your free choice comes from God, but the opting for this over that comes from
you. See Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 117–121.
11
Bernard Berofsky, “Global Control and Freedom,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006),
419–445; David Blumenfeld, “Freedom and Mind Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly
25 (1988), 215–227; Bruce Waller, “Free Will Gone Out of Control,” Behaviorism 16 (1988),
149–157; and Gary Watson, “Free Action and Free Will,” Mind 96 (1987), 145–172.
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Mele counters that it may not be the hypothesis of determinism that
elicits the intuition that the agents in the four cases are not responsible.
He argues that we can construct cases analogous to Pereboom’s 1 and 2
where there is indeterminism in the process of control and yet our intuition regarding the agent’s lack of responsibility remains unchanged. Thus
it is not the causal determination that elicits the intuition.12 He writes,
“for all Pereboom has shown, it is the manipulation, not the deterministic
causation, that does the intuition-driving work in his cases.”13 Pereboom,
in turn, responds that what Mele’s analogous cases likely show is that
“determinism nevertheless explains [the agent’s] non-responsibility in
[Pereboom’s] Case 2, while a deeper fact, such as the presence of causal
circumstances that precludes responsibility-relevant control, explains his
non-responsibility in both [the original and Mele’s analogous] cases.”14
Mele does not try to pinpoint exactly what the relevant difference between the manipulator and natural determinism is. I will argue that the
possibly relevant differences between a limited controller and the determinist universe disappear when the controller at issue is God. So what
might the relevant differences be? In the limited controller case in which
the mad scientist causes your choice, especially if it is a choice to do something wrong, we might hold that there is something morally wicked, or at
least suspect, in the controller’s behavior. And couldn’t the presence of a
blameworthy agent—other than you—in the history of your choice, drive
our intuition that you should not be held responsible? With the limited
controller this point has traction. We have, after all, hypothesized a mad
scientist or a megalomaniac behavioral engineer. History demonstrates that
when mere mortals put themselves in loco divinitatis and attempt to control
their fellows, things go badly for the would-be controlled. Perhaps these
thoughts form part of the background of our intuition that the controlled
agent is not free. And since natural causes in a determinist universe cannot be accused of moral turpitude, we have reason to believe that the
causation exercised by the controller is relevantly different from the natural causes at work in a determinist universe. But with the divine controller
what drives the intuition cannot be moral qualms about the behavior of
the controller. God is necessarily good, so our unwillingness to ascribe
moral responsibility to you when God causes you to choose to murder
cannot arise from our holding that God has behaved badly and so must
bear all, most, or at least some, of the responsibility.
Nonetheless we may hold that, even if we have to allow the controller’s
goodness ex hypothesi, you are still being used by another agent, and it is resentment at the thought of being used that drives our intuition that you are
not responsible in the divine controller case. The deterministic universe has
Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 138–144.
Ibid., 144.
14
Derk Pereboom, “On Free Will and Luck,” Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007), 163–172,
see 170.
12
13
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no purposes, so it is not using us and the situation is relevantly different. But
we can alter the divine controller case to ensure that you are not being used
in ways you could properly resent. We could say that, before God causes
your choice to murder, he shows you his plan, and you, seeing the benefits
that will ultimately be produced by your crime and punishment, agree to
allow him to cause the choice. (If your agreement is not freely given we may
be opening the way for an infinite regress, so perhaps we could add here
that God has bestowed on you an ability to make a libertarian free choice
for just long enough for you to choose to agree that God should cause you
to make the choice to murder.) Then he erases your memory and causes the
choice—but you agreed to it, so you are not really being used.15
Or suppose—contrary to the fact, alas—that God had made our world
one in which good deeds are rewarded with earthly benefits. Now God, to
achieve some purpose of his own, causes you to do something extremely
good for which he ensures that you reap the significant reward. Maybe
you win the lottery for six million dollars and live a long, healthy, happy life, dying peacefully in bed surrounded by friends and loved ones.
I would hold that, intuitively, you do not deserve your good fortune. You
just did what God made you do, and if he’d made me do the good deed, I’d
be the rich and happy one. It seems to me that the same conclusion about
desert would follow if we posit that it is the deterministic universe, rather
than God, that has made you do the good thing. Since you were made to
do the good deed, you don’t really deserve any reward. In this case we
cannot point to a difference between the divine and the natural controller
based on the premise that you resent being used by the divine controller.
You’re happy as a clam, and it would be odd for you to resent it!
Still, someone might argue that, whether or not you agreed to it, or resent it, in both of these examples you are still an instrument in the divine
plan. You are being used for a purpose and that indicates an ineradicable
difference between the divine controller and the deterministic universe.
So change the example just a little more. God causes you to choose to
murder (or to do the extremely good deed) for no reason at all. There is
no plan or purpose. Those unfamiliar with the history of western theism might suppose that a God who wills something without their being
a good reason for it is a fanciful invention, kin to the mad neuroscientist
and the megalomaniacal behavioral engineer. But no. There is a major
strand in the philosophy of religion, going back at least to Alghazali in the
eleventh century and ably represented by William of Ockham, that insists
upon the primacy of the divine will, even above the divine intellect. God,
15
I grant that this is an odd case. Could we argue that, since you agreed to have it caused
in you, you are responsible for the choice to murder? But the situation we have envisioned
is one in which the choice to murder, if it is a responsible choice, is blameworthy. Are you
properly blamed for the murder and simultaneously properly praised for agreeing to have
the choice to murder caused in you and so to suffer as an instrument of the divine plan?
For a similar, but even stranger, suggestion see Alvin Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O
Felix Culpa’” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), 1–25.
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according to this school of thought, is unqualifiedly free to choose anything logically possible. The Good is whatever God should choose. Thus
his will is necessarily “good” and is not constrained by anything. He may
cause a choice in a created agent without this being “in order to” achieve
anything. He just causes it. So the created agent is not being used as a
means to an end any more than if his choice were caused for no purpose
by a deterministic universe.16
So we cannot ascribe morally doubtful qualities to the divine controller,
and we can construct scenarios in which the controlled agent is not being
used. Still, isn’t there, in the controller scenario, whether we are talking
about a limited or a divine controller, an inevitable element of intervention,
of manipulation, by the controller, which is just not there in the deterministic universe? With the limited controller it would seem that some sort of
intervention or manipulation would have to be part of the scenario, but
not necessarily with the divine controller. Intervention and manipulation,
I take it, imply that the controlled agent exists independently of the controller such that the controller must “step in” and tinker with the agent.
Someone who intervenes or manipulates introduces changes which turn
the agent from the path he likely would have followed. If we take our
divine controller to be the God of classical theism—of Thomas Aquinas,
as the prime example—then complete divine control does not entail any
intervening per se. Classical theism holds that God’s creation consists in
sustaining everything in being from moment to moment. Absolutely every created thing that has any ontological status is immediately caused
by God simultaneously with its existence.17 Thus nothing which is not
God—no object, no positive property, no action—exists independently of
God’s directly causing it.18
This is not to deny the sorts of causes that science describes. The causal
connections we observe in nature are real and play the explanatory role
which science ascribes to them. To pick a standard medieval example, we
can observe fire burning cotton. If we then ask, “What caused the cotton
to burn?,” the correct answer is “the fire.” But all of the objects with their
properties and their behavior—the whole system of cause and effect—is
kept in being immediately by God. In the parlance of Thomas’s day, God
is the primary cause and the natural causes are secondary causes; secondary not in any temporal sense, but in the hierarchical sense that they
16
It could be claimed that the divinely controlled agent is different from the agent in
the deterministic universe because he has been uniquely “singled out.” His choices are
not caused in the “normal” way. That is easily answered by hypothesizing that every nondivine agent is a divinely controlled agent.
17
Thomas would take it that a metaphysics in which a cause must, by definition, precede
its effect temporally is deeply misguided.
18
Even the laws of logic and mathematics do not exist independently of God, but rather
are reflections of his nature as necessary being. Something might rightly be said to have the
property of “being evil,” but evil per se is an absence or lack of what ought to be there, and
so “being evil” is not a positive property. On this view God could be said to cause an evil
choice, without his being the cause of evil per se.
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are dependent upon God for their existence. What caused the cotton to
burn? The fire as the secondary cause and God as the primary cause. But
God did not “intervene” or “manipulate” either the fire or the cotton. He
simply caused them to exist as what they are with all their properties and
behavior. So we can hypothesize a God who is sustaining everything in
being from moment to moment, even you with your choices and subsequent actions.19 (This does not rule out the possibility of God producing
unlooked-for effects—miracles. But in order to counter the “intervener”
point all we need is an instance of God causing your choice in a way that
does not suggest that you exist independently of God such that He interferes as a limited controller would have to do.20) So, while God may be a
complete divine controller, He need not be a manipulator or intervener. In
the divine controller argument your lack of responsibility for the choice to
murder cannot be ascribed to your having been mistreated, used, or even
simply manipulated, by the controller.
Could it be that our intuition about the controller is really rooted in the
simple fact that we resent conforming to what someone else wants us to
do? Surely not. In the course of our lives we do many, many things that
other people want us to do. It would be bizarre to suggest that that alone
interferes with moral responsibility. Suppose there is an ideal observer
who, without causing you to do anything, observes everything you do.
And suppose it turns out that everything you do is just what the ideal
observer wants you to do. There is no element in this picture to vitiate
your moral responsibility. Nor can your lack of responsibility be ascribed
to the divine controller knowing ahead of time what you will choose. Divine foreknowledge does not translate into divine, or any other sort, of
problematic necessitation of the foreknown. In fact it can be reconciled
with our choices being “up to us” in the sense requisite for libertarian
freedom.21 What is worrisome in the controller scenario is not that someone wants us to do something, or that someone might know beforehand

19
I would consider Thomas a compatibilist, in that he holds that, while our choices
are caused by something other than ourselves—God as primary cause—we are still responsible. Of course, our choices are also caused by us, as secondary causes. See Summa
Theologiae 1, Q.83, art.1, ad.3 and Summa Contra Gentiles 1:68. Brian Shanley, O.P., argues
that, since the divine causation in question is not the temporally antecedent natural causation posited by contemporary determinism, it is better not to label Thomas a compatibilist (“Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom,” in Freedom and the Human Person, ed. Richard Velkley [Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 2007], 70–89). Hugh McCann has recently proposed a view
very close to Thomas’s. See “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will,” Faith and
Philosophy 12 (1995), 582–598; “Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe,” Faith and
Philosophy 18 (2001), 110–116; and “The Author of Sin?,” Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005),
144–159. In response see Katherin Rogers, “Does God Cause Sin? Anselm of Canterbury versus Jonathan Edwards on Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty,” Faith and
Philosophy 20 (2003), 371–378 and “God is not the Author of Sin,” Faith and Philosophy 24
(2007), 300–310.
20
This is the thesis of Hugh McCann, “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will.”
21
See Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, chaps. 8 and 9.
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that we will do something. That leaves the worry that someone makes us
do something.
Taking a cue from Pereboom’s progressive, four-case argument, I propose that our intuition about moral responsibility should stay the same
as we hypothesize a divine controller whose causal activity is mediated
and so comes to look more and more like that at work in a determinist
universe. Suppose, in a departure from classical theism, that God sustains
the world in being from moment to moment indirectly by immediately
causing an angelic intelligence which, in turn, causes and sustains everything that is not God or the angel. God is immediately sustaining this
angelic intelligence in being, and causing it to cause everything else that
there is, including you and your choice to murder. (Note that there is still
no question of intervention or manipulation since you do not exist independently.) So your choice is caused directly by the angelic intelligence
and only indirectly by God. Do you now deserve to be punished? But there
is no important difference here between the divine controller simpliciter,
and the divine controller causing through the divinely controlled angelic
controller, is there? Your choice is not “up to you.” It is still up to God, but
at one remove. Adding a chain of angels, a multi-tiered hierarchy of simultaneous angelic causes, would not add anything in which your aseity, and
hence your moral responsibility, could be grounded. Nor would replacing
the angelic intelligence with a mechanistic cause or chain of causes. If
God creates a machine which makes you along with your choice, or which
makes another machine which makes you, there has been no element either added or subtracted to produce the sort of new situation in which
your moral responsibility can be grounded.
Suppose, instead of simultaneous causal activity, we hypothesize that
the divine controller—now quite distant from the God of classical theism—operates through a temporally successive series of causes, starting
before your conception, which brings you and, later, your subsequent
choice, into being. Again, there seems to be nothing in this picture which
should change our original assessment. If your choice is caused by God,
you are not responsible for it. Finally, take the above suggestion one step
further. Suppose that God should arrange all the necessitating causes for
you and your choice to murder within the initial singularity, should light
the fuse for the Big Bang, and then, per impossibile, should blink out of
being. Now the determining chain of natural causes unfolds following
the divine plan but without immediate divine guidance up to the point
where you choose to murder and commit the murder. Now do you deserve
to be punished? I do not see that, with the point that God is the ultimate
cause of your choice remaining the same, the absence of God at the time
you come to trial injects anything into (or subtracts anything from) the
situation sufficient to ground your aseity and moral responsibility.
And if it is the fact that we are made to do something that conflicts
with our having genuine aseity and moral responsibility, then it is difficult to see the relevant difference between someone doing the making
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and something such as the causes at work in a deterministic universe.22
There seems to be nothing relevant to distinguish our final hypothetical
universe where God arranges everything and then disappears leaving the
chain of causes to unfold and the deterministic universe without God in
its pre-history. If you are not responsible for the choice to murder in the
former, then you are not responsible in the latter. If an agent who is divinely controlled is not morally responsible, then an agent whose choices
are caused by a deterministic universe is not morally responsible.
IV. A Tollens Response?
The compatibilist may agree with that last proposition, but negate the
consequent. That is, he may believe that Premise 2 in the divine controller
argument is true, but that Premise 1 is false. And he can argue his point
by running a sort of tollens version of the divine controller argument.
1*. Even if natural causes in a deterministic universe causally necessitate your choice, you may nonetheless be morally responsible for it.
2. Causal necessitation of your choice due to natural causes in a deterministic universe is relevantly similar to divine causal necessitation.
Therefore
3*. Even if God causally necessitates your choice, you may nonetheless
be morally responsible for it.
Call this the “tollens” argument.
According to the compatibilist, you can be responsible even in a deterministic universe, assuming you meet the criteria for responsibility proposed by the compatibilist. So the compatibilist can hold that if Premise
2 is true, it follows that you can be responsible although divinely controlled, again assuming you meet the proper criteria. The compatibilist
may allow that neither the incompatibilist’s divine controller argument
nor his own tollens argument can be shown to have more intuitive power or argumentative support than its rival. And so the discussion over
which argument is more plausible ends in a draw. But in that case, it could
be argued, the compatibilist wins, since it was the incompatibilist who
proposed the controller argument in order to show that compatibilism
is mistaken.23

22
Perhaps the critic might point to the fact that the controller is one thing while “the
causes at work in the deterministic universe” are many and complex (Marius Usher, “Control, Choice, and the Convergence/Divergence Dynamics: A Compatibilistic Probabilistic
Theory of Free Will,” The Journal of Philosophy 103 [2006], 188–213, see 210–213). But it is not
clear what sort of relevant distinction could be drawn from this. In any case, the defender
of the divine controller argument could construct a scenario in which God introduces all
sorts of complex causes in addition to his act of primary causation.
23
Michael McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008), 142–159.
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But this is a bit hasty. There is an asymmetry between the divine controller and the tollens arguments.24 The premise in the divine controller
argument says that if God causes your choice you are not morally responsible. So, for example, it just isn’t fair for God, or anyone, to punish you for
a murder that God caused you to choose and commit. I take this to be an
intuitive claim which is immediate (you see it as soon as you understand
the terms), powerful, and widely accepted. This intuitive strength is taken
to provide strong prima facie reason to accept the claim. The premise in
the tollens argument—although you are determined you can be morally
responsible—certainly cannot lay claim to that sort of intuitive support.
To be plausible at all, it must assume a fairly sophisticated form of compatibilism. Among compatibilists there are many different views on what
the proper criteria for moral responsibility are. Each view has its adherents, but they are comparatively few, being drawn from the already small
pool of those who study metaphysics. And they were brought to their conclusion by lengthy argument, often beginning with dissatisfaction with
libertarianism, not by some immediate “seeing” that it must be the case.
The premise in the tollens argument does not have the prima facie intuitive
strength that the premise in the divine controller argument does. That
means that when we arrive at the intuitively difficult conclusion that we
are morally responsible—we deserve to be punished or rewarded—even if our
choices are caused by God, our reason to accept the conclusion, rather
than rejecting the premise, is comparatively weak.
The compatibilist could argue that if we limit our “intuition pool” to
those who are educated about the issues, Premise 1* in the tollens argument might have significant appeal based on accepting the truth of the
conjunction of two claims; (a) we are free and responsible and (b) indeterminist accounts of choice cannot successfully ground our freedom and responsibility. So, if we are indeed free and responsible, it must be possible
for us to be free and responsible on a determinist view.25 Claim (a) does
seem intuitively powerful and widespread. Can (b) make the same boast?
Presumably, accepting (b) would be based on having rejected attempts to
construct indeterminist accounts of free and responsible action. Robert
Kane, for example, has proposed a libertarian analysis of free will which
involves sophisticated and plausible responses to claim (b).26 Upon long
and careful study, some might, I suppose, decide that Kane’s arguments,
and similar efforts along those lines, fail. And some might go even further
and conclude that future attempts at a successful libertarian account are
doomed. It would take a lot of study, then, to conclude that claim (b) is
justified. Thus, unless we draw the circle of the “educated” to ensure the
24
Derk Pereboom, “A Hard-line Reply,” makes a somewhat similar point, but the case
can be made more forcefully in the context of the divine controller argument.
25
Mele, Free Will and Luck, as a “reflective agnostic” offers a tentative suggestion along
these lines, 191.
26
Robert Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), 217–
240.
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result, it seems wildly improbably that “you are determined yet free and
responsible” has the same intuitive force as “you don’t deserve to be punished for what God made you do.”
I stand by the claim that there is an asymmetry between the first premises of the divine controller and the tollens arguments. And this asymmetry entails a burden of proof on the compatibilist to strengthen the
premise in the tollens argument or else show that the conclusion is not as
difficult as it intuitively appears at first. And here the contemporary compatibilist may well insist that he has in fact been hard at work doing both
of these things at once. Much of the thrust of contemporary compatibilism
has been aimed at responding to the libertarian’s traditional claim, the
claim that I take to support the original intuition in the controller case: in
order for us to be morally responsible, our choices must be “up to us” in
the right way. Contemporary compatibilists propose criteria which would
ground the claim that a determined agent could be morally responsible,
making determined choices which are nonetheless properly from himself, a se. To the extent that their theories are attractive, the premise in the
tollens argument is strengthened, and the power of the original intuition
driving the divine controller argument is vitiated to the point where, as
the tollens argument concludes, we should allow that divine causation of
your choice does not conflict with your freedom. However, it is my contention that contemporary compatibilist theories fail to do the job, leaving
the tollens move ultimately unsuccessful.
V. Two Examples of the Tollens Move
In defense of my contention, I look briefly at two recent compatibilist theories, one proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker and the other by Alfred Mele,
both of which explicitly raise the controller argument and make the tollens
move. My responses to these two positions can, I think, be applied with
similar effect against other compatibilist views, mutatis mutandis.
Baker endorses Frankfurt’s account wherein harmony between one’s
first- and second-order desires and volitions plays a crucial role in one’s
having real freedom. But on Frankfurt’s account, the harmony is sufficient
for moral responsibility, which leaves the view open to attack from the
controller argument. If the mad neuroscientist (Baker’s preferred controller) produces your first-order desires, and also produces the second-order
desires by which you embrace and identify with your first-order desires,
it seems very odd to hold you free and responsible. Baker argues that
Frankfurt’s account can be shielded from the controller problem with the
additional criterion that the responsible agent must reflectively endorse
the beliefs and desires on which he acts. The idea is roughly this: Suppose
an agent could know that the desires and beliefs which have produced her
wanting to will X were produced by causal factors beyond her control. If,
with this knowledge, the agent would still have “willed X, and wanted
to will X and willed X because she* wanted to will X,” then we should
consider her responsible. (The “*” follows “she” to indicate the desires and
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beliefs to be from a first-person perspective.)27 Baker writes, “If I can say,
‘These desires reflect who I am, and this is the kind of person that I want
to be,’ then (surely!) I am morally responsible for acting on those desires—
whether determinism is true or not.”28
Baker argues that the Reflective-Endorsement view does not succumb
to the controller argument. First, in order to be morally responsible, a
being must have a first-person perspective, but the mad neuroscientist,
in Baker’s view, cannot supply the agent with a first-person perspective
through brain manipulation. This point fails against the divine controller
argument, since God can create someone with a first-person perspective
without any “manipulation” at all. Baker goes on to argue that, for someone who already has a first-person perspective, if , knowing that his wanting to will X is the effect of the mad neuroscientist, he would repudiate
willing X, then he would not be responsible for willing X. If, with the same
knowledge, he would still want to will X, then he would be responsible.
Baker notes that the incompatibilist might push the controller argument another step and posit that the mad neuroscientist is the cause of the
informed agent’s still wanting to will X and adds a completeness clause,
“There is no further knowledge of the circumstances of the agent’s endorsement of his willing X that would lead the agent to repudiate his
endorsement of his willing X.” An agent who would repudiate wanting to
will X if he knew that the neuroscientist was the source of his not repudiating it is not responsible for willing X. An agent who would still want to
will X is responsible.
Apply Baker’s analysis to the example I used in the divine controller
argument: God causes you to choose to murder. He causes in you a firstorder volition to murder, and He causes in you a second-order volition to
desire to murder. He causes you such that you embrace and identify with
your willing to murder. At this point in the example, if we ask whether
or not you deserve to be punished, I take it that most of us still share the
original intuition—of course not! Now add Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement criterion. God makes you such that, if you knew that He is the cause
of your endorsing your willing to murder, you would nonetheless remain
steadfast in endorsing your willing to murder. Add that God is the cause
of your nonetheless remaining steadfast, and include the completeness
point—God makes you such that, if you had complete knowledge of the
causes of your willing to murder, and you knew that He is the cause of
your nonetheless remaining steadfast in your desire, you would still endorse your willing to murder. On Baker’s account, although the first- and
second-order volitions and the reflective endorsing are all caused by God,
you meet the criteria for responsibility. It is just to punish you for the
murder. Thus, even if your choice is caused by a deterministic universe,
27
Lynne Rudder Baker, “Moral Responsibility without Libertarianism,” Nous 40 (2006),
307–330, see 316–317.
28
Ibid., 318.
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you are responsible, and so, assuming you meet the criteria, you can be
responsible even when God causes your choice.
The incompatibilist is likely to remain unmoved. The reason for saying
that you are not responsible when God causes your choices was that your
choices did not originate with you. Baker has added a number of criteria,
but, once they are spelled out within the divine controller argument, it is
clear that they do not contribute anything at all towards securing aseity
for the agent. They do not add or subtract anything which should make
us change our minds regarding the original intuition. If, as the intuition
holds, I am not free and responsible when God directly makes me choose
X, then I am not free and responsible when God directly makes me want
to choose X even though I know everything there is to know about how
He has made me want to choose X. But if neither of these actions on my
part is free, it seems unlikely that their conjunction would be free. So I
am not free and responsible when He directly makes me to choose X and
directly makes me want to choose X even though I know everything there
is to know about how He has made me want to choose X. Contrary to
Baker’s claim, if I can say, “These desires reflect who [God has made me
to be], and this is the kind of person that [God has made me] want to be,”
then (surely!) I am [not!] morally responsible for acting on these desires—
[God being the author of all].
Or take, as a different example, the complex analysis of autonomy which
Alfred Mele offers in his 1995 Autonomous Agents. He holds that an agent
who meets his proposed criteria may be free and responsible even if determined, and he explicitly addresses the controller argument. Mele explains
that to be psychologically autonomous one must first be an “ideally selfcontrolled agent.” That is (to offer a very sketchy outline) one must meet
four criteria: (1) One must have self-control which ranges across all the relevant categories—overt actions, mental actions, intentions, beliefs, etc. etc.
(2) One must exercise self-control, not errantly, but in support of decisive
better judgments, values, etc. etc. (3) One must exercise self-control whenever one reflectively deems it appropriate, and (4) The exercises of self-control “always succeed in supporting what they are aimed at supporting.”29
In addition to being an ideally self-controlled agent, the psychologically autonomous agent must meet three more conditions, the “compatibilist trio”:
1. The agent has no compelled* motivational states, nor any coercively
produced motivational states.30
2. The agent’s beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation about all
matters that concern him.
3. The agent is a reliable deliberator.31
Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 121.
The asterisk indicates compulsion not arranged by the agent. Ibid., 166.
31
Ibid., 187.
29

30
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Note that meeting these criteria enables the autonomous agent to evaluate his values and “shed” them should he find sufficient reason to do so.
This is an ability which Mele holds to be central to autonomy.32
In responding to the challenge posed by Kane’s covert nonconstraining controller (CNC), Mele argues that his psychologically autonomous
agent could not suffer such control since the controller must operate
through control of the victim’s motivational attitudes, as in brainwashing,
or through control of the victim’s informational attitudes, as in deceit, or
through control of the victim’s executive qualities, as in covert conditioning. But the victim of such control would not satisfy the compatibilist trio.
Mele grants that the victim of CNC is not free, but holds that an agent
produced by natural causes might be determined, and yet still meet the
criteria. The controller argument fails because the causes inherent in the
controller scenario are sufficiently different from the causes at work in
a deterministic universe to allow us to deny autonomy to the controlled
agent in the former, yet still grant it to the determined agent in the latter.33
This response to the controller argument does not work when we posit
a divine controller. We can change the hypothesis so that God causes you
with your choice to murder and causes you in such a way that you meet
every one of Mele’s criteria. God causes you as a person capable of evaluating and possibly shedding your values. He causes you to be ideally selfcontrolled. He causes your properly formed motivational states. There
is no compulsion. (Compulsion, for Mele, means, in addition to literal,
physical force, the sort of state induced by irresistible desire, such as drug
addiction.34 But there is nothing like that here.) God causes the required
sort of belief formation and the subsequent beliefs. And He causes the
reliable deliberations which lead you to the choice to murder—which He
causes as well.
Mele addresses a similar supposition, hypothesizing a creator who creates an adult agent with all of the requisites for autonomy. He concludes,
making the tollens move, that someone whose choices are caused by (his
analogue of) a divine controller in such a way that his criteria for autonomy are met is indeed autonomous.35 More recently, Mele has introduced
a somewhat different controller argument, the “zygote” argument. This
argument is rather like my penultimate development of the divine controller argument in which God causes your choice through a temporal
sequence of natural, necessitating causes. I held that, since there was no
change as regards your aseity from the initial case in which God simply
causes your choice immediately, we should not change our view that you
are not responsible. In Mele’s argument the motivating example is this:
Ibid., 153, 190.
Ibid., 187–189.
34
Ibid., 136–137.
35
Ibid., 190. His version is most like my case where God arranges everything at the Big
Bang.
32

33
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Diana creates a zygote, Z, in Mary because she wants event E to occur
thirty years later. Diana is in a determinist universe and knows what the
state of the universe is right before she creates Z and what the laws of
nature are. She deduces that Z will develop into an agent, Ernie, who will
A and thus bring about E in thirty years. Ernie has all of the attributes
and engages in all of the processes Mele takes to satisfy a compatibilist
account of sufficient conditions for A-ing freely. Analogous to the divine
controller argument, the first premise of the zygote argument states that
Ernie is not a free and responsible agent. The second premise notes that
“there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zygote comes
to exist and the way any normal human zygote comes to exist in a deterministic universe.” And the conclusion is that “determinism precludes
free action and moral responsibility.”36
Mele holds that, given the point mentioned above that many of the
educated have serious doubts about the possibility of free and responsible action on the part of agents making indetermined choices, one might
intuitively reject the first premise of the zygote argument. In that case,
Ernie may be free and responsible even though Diana has created him
through his zygote such that he will A to effect E. Mele says that he is
himself agnostic and notes that many factors drive intuitions. For example, if A is a praiseworthy action we may be more likely to hold Ernie
responsible than if it is a blameworthy one.37 In response, I grant that our
intuitions are inexact and can mislead, but casting the example within
the divine controller argument simplifies the elements involved and clarifies the situation. As I suggested above, it seems clear that if you do what
you do because God makes you do it, you are not responsible. If you do
evil, you do not deserve the blame and punishment, and if you do good,
you do not deserve the praise and reward. There is relevant symmetry
involved in God making you do the evil or the good in that in neither case
do you choose a se. In both cases the decisive causal impetus for the choice
is from God and not from you. And given that symmetry, there should be
no asymmetry in our views about your deserts.38
Pursuing the question of what might affect our intuitions, Mele goes
on to suggest that one’s view of the nature of causation may be relevant.
Suppose Diana and Ernie inhabit a universe with Humean causation.
There is no causal necessitation at work, but only regularities. (Or, if you
take the Humean theory to be epistemic rather than metaphysical, there
is no knowable causal necessitation. For our purposes either interpretation grounds the same problem.) The “laws” cannot actually be known
until the universe has ended, since only then can it be ascertained what
Mele, Free Will and Luck, 188–189.
Ibid., 193.
38
This point counts tellingly against views such as Susan Wolf’s (Freedom within Reason),
which hold that the determined agent who chooses well is responsible, while the determined agent who chooses badly is not.
36
37
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regularities occurred consistently, if any. It is in part Ernie’s doing A that
brings about the “laws.” Diana cannot ensure that Ernie will do A even
with her perfect knowledge of the state of the universe before she makes
Z. Unless she knows all the future she cannot know the “laws,” and, in
any case, whatever is involved in her (supposed) creation of Z, there is no
(known) causal necessity that Z will grow into Ernie or that Ernie will A,
since there is no (known) causal necessity at all. If Z grows into Ernie, and
Ernie A’s, it will not be due (or cannot be known to be due) to Diana’s efforts.
Mele suggests that doubts about the possibility of ours being a Humean
universe might lead one to deny the force of the zygote argument.39
I would go a step further and argue that, on a Humean analysis of causation, no version of the controller argument can get off the ground. There
are many versions and interpretations of Humeanism, but standardly the
view involves at least two core commitments: (1) The observed fact that
events of type Q have consistently followed events of type P does not
justify the claim that events of type Q occur because of events of type P.
A constant conjunction does not justify asserting a necessary causal connection. We are not in a position to assert any necessary causal connections at all. (2) For all we know, if an event of type P occurs in the future,
it will not be followed by an event of type Q. Indeed, we cannot make
any justified claims about what the future will hold. But the controller
argument hypothesizes that the controller can control, that the controller
causes, the agent to make some choice. In a Humean universe, assuming
we are talking about a limited “controller” who operates within the physical system, we are never justified in claiming that the controller controls.
This is true even of the mad neurosurgeon who (supposedly) directly acts
on the brain of the would-be controlled. As with Mele’s case of Diana, if
the controller pushes the button which he supposes to cause choice X in
the agent, and the agent then chooses X, we are not justified in asserting
that the controller produced the choice to X in the agent. At the most, if we
knew the entire history of the universe, we might be able to claim a regularity. But that is not control. The very hypothesis of a limited controller is
at odds with a Humean analysis of causation.
What about a divine controller who transcends the universe of Humean causation? There have been theists who argued for a divine controller operating on a Humean universe. Alghazali, the famous Muslim
fideist, gives roughly the reasons Hume gives for skepticism about causation between the objects and events in the physical universe. He comes to
the conclusion that God is the immediate cause of everything that happens and there are no causal connections between objects and events. On
this occasionalist view, we could (and do!) hypothesize a God who causes
your choices. The problem is that, in the occasionalist universe, Premise
2 of the divine controller argument is just false. Divine causation, where
39
Mele, Free Will and Luck, 194. See also, Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele, “Humean Compatibilism,” Mind 111 (2002), 201–224.
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God brings things about, is not relevantly like causation in the natural
universe, since there is no “bringing about” sort of causation in the natural universe. At most, there are only regularities.
The controller argument depends upon assuming a necessitarian analysis of causation—or, at least, a non-Humean analysis. It requires the assumption that causes, divine or natural, bring about effects. The Humean
has more against the zygote argument than just intuitive doubts about the
first premise. Diana’s actions do not (to our knowledge) produce Z, so the
initial hypothesis conflicts with a Humean universe. The second premise
holds that “there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zygote comes to exist and the way any normal human zygote comes to exist
in a deterministic universe.” But in a Humean universe we are justified in
making claims neither about how Z came into being nor about how normal human zygotes come into being. (Even on the level of observed regularities, how many normal zygotes have you seen coming into being?)
The Humean, then, should not allow the second premise or the original
Diana-maker-of-Z thought experiment. Mele’s point regarding the effect
of Humeanism on one’s intuitive response to the first premise seems to
miss the mark. The Humean is not in a position to make the tollens argument in response to the divine controller argument.40
The compatibilist who pushes the tollens argument and so denies the
first premise of the divine controller argument had better do so on the
basis of a plausible version of compatibilism which provides the agent
with the requisites for freedom even in a (necessitarian) determined universe. I take it this is exactly what compatibilists like Mele (or “possible
compatibilists” since he says he is an agnostic?) attempt to do. But in the
original divine controller argument the claim was that you are not responsible because God made you to choose what you choose and your
choice did not originate with you. If, in a determinist universe, you are
made to choose what you choose and your choice does not originate with
you, then you are similarly not responsible. Mele’s addition of his purportedly “autonomy-making” properties does not address that conclusion. If
we have qualms about your responsibility when God causes your choice,
why should they be alleviated when God causes your deliberating and
then causes your choice? With the addition of Mele’s criteria to the agent
in the divine controller example, you are simply doing more things—
exercising self-control, deliberating, shedding values, etc.,—that God
makes you do.41 If it seemed unjust that you be punished for a murder
40
It is not surprising that a Humean view of causation has not played a role in the free
will debate. Presumably, as we discuss the cluster of relevant questions, we must suppose
that your choices cause your actions, that you are recognizably the same person over time,
that all sorts of facts about you and the world influence how you choose, that we will not, in
the next five minutes, all turn into toads with wings. Take recognizable causal connections
out of the picture and all bets are off.
41
Dennett, Elbow Room, asks us to consider, rather than the demonic neuroscientist, the
“eloquent philosopher who indirectly manipulates a person’s brain” through persuasive
reasons (64–65). If God causes you to choose to murder through causing your mental states
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God made you choose to commit, it seems equally unjust that you be punished when God causes you to choose to murder and causes you to do all
sorts of other things which function as secondary causes, causing you
to murder. It seems implausible to hold that you are not responsible for
doing X when God directly causes you to do X and only X, but you are responsible for doing X when God directly causes you do to X and Y and Z.
Our question was whether or not contemporary compatibilists could
produce an intuitively powerful tollens argument against the divine controller argument, thus defeating the incompatibilist’s attempt to tip the
scales of debate in favor of incompatibilism. The challenge was to construct a compatibilism persuasive enough to weaken intuitive resistance
to the conclusion that you are responsible for your divinely caused choice.
But the addition of any number of other elements to the history and background of the choice, if those elements are divinely caused, does nothing
to shake the intuition that if God causes your choice, you are not responsible. Both Baker and Mele grant that divine controller scenarios can be
constructed which are sufficiently similar to their naturalist causation
scenarios such that, if you are free and responsible in the naturalist scenario, then you are free and responsible in the divine controller scenario.
But neither succeeds in making it really plausible that you could be free
in the divine controller scenario. I suspect that other compatibilist theories would fare the same against the divine controller argument. If the
original intuition that you are not free and responsible when God directly
causes your choices is as wide-spread and as powerful as I take it to be,
then the divine controller argument is more persuasive than the tollens
argument and provides good reason to adopt incompatibilism.42
University of Delaware

and causing the philosopher to present the persuasive reasons such that you are determined, by these factors, to choose to murder (or to choose to sell all you have and give to the
poor), then it seems to me that you are not deserving of blame (or of praise). The reason we
are not offended at the thought of “manipulation” by the eloquent philosopher is presumably that we assume that his eloquence does not “induce” our desires, beliefs, and decisions
in a way that closes off options and determines us to one choice rather than another. He is
not really analogous to the controller in the controller argument.
42
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